GOOGLE LIBRARY: BEYOND FAIR USE?
ELISABETH HANRATTY1

ABSTRACT
Last December Google announced the formation of
partnerships with select major libraries to begin digitizing and
storing the libraries’ collections online. Google aims to provide
individuals with the ability to search the full text of these books
from anywhere using the Google search engine. This project will
greatly increase access to those works in the public domain, but
what about the books still under copyright protection? This iBrief
examines the copyright implications of this ambitious project and
concludes that the project, as described, does infringe the rights of
copyright holders.
It further concludes that while such
infringement is unlikely to be found to be a fair use, it may
ultimately be in the copyright holders’ best interests to acquiesce to
Google’s infringement.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
On December 14, 2004, Google announced partnerships with a
handful of major libraries to make digital copies of their collections
available online.2 This project is neither Google’s nor its library partners’
first foray into digitization. In fact, some of the libraries Google is
partnering with were already taking similar steps on their own, but Google’s
plan is certainly the most ambitious. Over the next decade,3 Google plans to
add over fifteen million library volumes4 to its electronic index at an
estimated cost of ten dollars per book, or $150 million.5 Google will
1

J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.S. in Finance and
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Google is partnering with The New York Public Library as well as the libraries
at Harvard University, the University of Michigan, Stanford University and the
University of Oxford. Press Release, Google, Google Checks Out Library
Books (Dec. 14, 2004), at
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2005) [hereinafter Google Press Release]; Google Library Project FAQs,
Google, at http://print.google.com/googleprint/library.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2005) [hereinafter Google Library FAQs].
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Database, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A1.
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provide the participating libraries with an electronic copy of the works they
contributed to the project.6 The project is an expansion of an existing
Google program, Google Print, which allows publishers to submit their
collections to Google to be scanned and entered into the Google search
engine.7 Unlike the Google Print program, which requires publishers to
submit a copy of each book which will be dismantled and destroyed in
digitization,8 the library books will be returned to the libraries unharmed
upon completion of the scanning process.9 Once the text is scanned and
entered into the system’s index, Google’s search engine examines the full
text of the scanned works for compatibility with search terms and returns
links to pertinent books, along with the typical website listings, for every
user search.10
¶2
The search results will depend on the copyright status of the book.
For works in the public domain, the user will have access to the entire text.
For works under copyright protection, the user will see the bibliographic
information as well as a few text “snippets” around the search term, unless
the publisher has given Google permission to display more text.11 Google
equates viewing the displayed results of copyrighted works to the
“experience of flipping through a book in a bookstore” or library.12 To
further protect the copyright holders, Google disables the user’s print, save,
cut and copy functions on the text display pages so that the user is limited to
reading the information on the screen.13 Alongside the text, there will be
6

Press Release, University of Michigan News Service, Google/U-M Project
Opens the way to Universal Access to Information (Dec. 14, 2004), at
http://www.umich.edu/news/?Releases/2004/Dec04/library/index (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005). In contrast, Google Print does not give publishers electronic
copies of the works they submit to Google to scan, this aspect is unique to the
library program.
7
Google Press Release, supra note 2; Google Print FAQs, Google, at
https://print.google.com/publisher/online_faq (last visited Apr. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Google Print FAQs].
8
Google Print FAQs, supra note 7.
9
See News Release, Stanford News Service, Stanford and Google to make
Library Books Available Online (Dec. 14, 2004), at
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/2004/pr-google-011205.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Stanford Press Release]; Adair Lara, ‘Googleizing’
Libraries Won’t Replace Books, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 2004, at E1.
10
Google Press Release, supra note 2; Stanford Press Release, supra note 9
(“create digital searchable pages”).
11
An example of what the results will look like is available at:
http://print.google.com/googleprint/screenshots.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
See Google Print FAQs, supra note 7 (Publisher can give permission to display
more through the Google Print program).
12
Google Press Release, supra note 2; Google Library FAQs, supra note 2.
13
Google Print FAQs, supra note 7.
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links to “buy this book” from numerous vendors as well as advertisements
specially targeted to the displayed text.14
¶3
There are numerous ramifications of this bold project, most of
which are outside the scope of this iBrief.15 The focus of this iBrief is the
copyright implications of reproducing and displaying a portion of a digital
copy of library books that are still under copyright protection. Although
Google insists the undertaking will display all library materials “in keeping
with copyright law,”16 Google has not offered details on how it can
reconcile the plan with current copyright law. In making the digital copy,
Google is infringing on the reproduction right of the copyright holder and
continues that infringement when it allows a portion of a copyrighted work
to be displayed on a user’s computer screen without permission from that
copyright holder. Without a significant change in interpretation of the law,
it is unlikely that Google will be able to successfully claim its actions
constitute fair use, and the project clearly does not qualify for protection
under the Copyright Act’s library exemption.17 This iBrief will discuss
these issues in more detail as well as potential ways to resolve the conflict
between the copyright holders and Google.

I. PRIMA FACIE CASE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
¶4
For books, copyright law reserves certain separate and exclusive
rights to copyright holders and their licensees. These include the right to
make and distribute copies18 of a work; the right to “prepare derivative

14

Google Press Release, supra note 2; Markoff & Wyatt, supra note 4; but see
Hiawatha Bray, Google to Index Works at Harvard, Other Major Libraries, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2004, at A1 (“For now, Google won’t display ads
alongside the search results for a particular book”).
15
Such issues include: concern over what will become of traditional libraries
and what new roles they should assume; issues of the future and integrity of the
digital medium and the usefulness of converting books to a temporarily relevant
format; issues pertaining to who is best suited to the role of gatekeeper for these
digital collections; how Google will determine exactly which books are still
subject to copyright protection and who the relevant copyright owner is
(publisher or author). While all valid and interesting issues, they are outside the
scope of this iBrief.
16
Google Press Release, supra note 2.
17
See 17 U.S.C. § 101–108 (2000).
18
While this term is plural, it is interpreted to include the singular as well.
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02(d) (Matthew Bender & Co. ed.
Lexis 2004) [hereinafter Nimmer]; 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1951) (unless implied or stated
otherwise, “words importing the plural include the singular”); H.R. REP. NO. 941476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 (“The references
to "copies or phonorecords," although in the plural, are intended here and
throughout the bill to include the singular.”).
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works based upon the copyrighted work;” and the right to display and
perform the work publicly.19 To prove infringement, a copyright holder
only needs to show: (1) ownership of the copyright in the work and (2) that
original elements of the work were copied.20 A copy does not need to be in
the same medium as the original, as long as it is fixed and communicable to
others.21 If these elements are met, infringement has occurred and liability
can only be negated if the infringer can offer a valid defense. The next two
sections will address relevant defenses.
¶5
Assuming, arguendo, that Google is simply making a digital copy
of the works that are still covered by copyright protection, and not
subsequently posting the work to its index, would that action be enough to
constitute copyright infringement? This question is essential to determining
whether Google’s actual actions constitute infringement. Without this
initial finding of an infringement, the rest of the inquiry is irrelevant; a fair
use defense is unnecessary where infringement has not occurred.
¶6
Some case law supports the notion that when a copyright is
infringed for “insubstantial purposes,” i.e. when infringement is de minimis,
a cause of action for infringement is unsupported.22 For instance, one court
found de minimis copying when a copy was made but not used.23 There is
no clear line as to where the standard of de minimus applies and what level
of use of a copy will exceed that standard, but the hurdle is likely minimal.24
One commentator looking at the de minimis jurisprudence determined that it
is a “defense [that] should be limited largely to its role in determining
substantial similarity or fair use.”25 Generally it is found “only if the

19

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
21
The definition of a copy is sufficiently elastic to allow for new technologies.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (“fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
22
Nimmer, supra note 18, at § 8.01(G); see also Ringgold v. Black Entm’t
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussion of uses of de
minimis).
23
See Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699,
(2d Cir. 1982).
24
See Nimmer, supra note 18, at § 8.01(G); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation,
Application of “De Minimis Non Curat Lex” to Copyright Infringement Claims,
150 A.L.R. FED. 661 (2004).
25
Nimmer, supra note 18, at §8.01(G). Neither substantial similarity nor fair
use, as they relate to the concept of de minimis, is in question here. Substantial
similarity is determined by Google’s admission that it is copying the works.
Fair use is generally not available when a work is copied in its entirety. Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
20
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average audience would not recognize the appropriation”26 and is applied to
“small and usually insignificant portion[s]” of the copyrighted work.27 In
short, the de minimis principle generally applies only in matters so trifling
the law does not deal with their disposal.28
¶7
Here, Google’s digitization of the library collections constitutes a
prima facie case of copyright infringement. Google has announced that it
will copy the entirety of the library texts involved, some of which are still
under copyright protection.29 The fact that the copy is digital rather than in
the form of a paper book is irrelevant.30 By copying the entirety of a
copyrighted work, Google is without question copying the original
expression protected by the copyright. This copying is enough to establish
a prima facie case of infringement. While Google could argue that the
project falls under the de minimis jurisprudence if the work is never
searched and is merely kept on its server, the sheer volume of copied work
reasons against a de minimis finding. It appears that only a valid defense
would keep this infringement from being actionable.

II. THE LIBRARY EXEMPTION
The Copyright Act provides libraries and archives an explicit
exemption from liability for copyright infringement under certain,
designated circumstances.31 For a library copy to be non-infringing it must:
(1) be a single copy (2) made by a library or archive or by employees of
such acting within the scope of their employment, (3) not be associated with
any commercial purpose, (4) be copied from a collection that is open to the
public or at least all researchers, and (5) include a notice of copyright.32
This exemption is limited to copies of unpublished works for archival
purposes, out-of-print works, or replacements for damaged and lost works.33
Even if all of these conditions are met, the library or archive can still only
make no more than three copies.34 An additional section of the Act allows a
library to make copies for users, at their request under very limited
¶8

26

Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003).
Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983);
see Buckman, supra note 24, at 2a.
28
J. Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1449, 1457-58 (June 1997).
29
Google Press Release, supra note 2; Google Library FAQs, supra note 2.
30
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
31
17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
32
Id., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 74 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659
at 5688.
33
17 U.S.C. § 108(b) – (e) (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 75-76.
34
17 U.S.C. § 108(b) – (e).
27
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circumstances, such as when only a small portion of an available,
copyrighted work is requested.35
¶9
The exemption’s legislative history clarifies the meaning and intent
of some of these constraints. Pertinent to Google’s project is the
requirement that the copy be made by the library/archive itself or one of its
employees. The history shows this exemption does not permit “a non-profit
institution, by means of contractual arrangements with a commercial
copying enterprise, to authorize the enterprise to carry out copying and
distribution functions that would be exempt if conducted by the non-profit
institution itself.”36 The legislative history also makes clear that the statute
would not excuse infringement liability if there was a “commercial motive
behind the actual making or distributing of copies, if multiple copies were
made or distributed, or if the photocopying activities were ‘systematic’ in
the sense that their aim was to substitute for subscriptions or purchases.”37
The systematic copying bar precludes an individual from requesting
different parts of a copyrighted work over a period of time in order to
eventually obtain the entirety of the work, even if for the purpose of
personal study.38 Additionally, even libraries are not exempt from this
“systematic” copy restriction in the arrangement of interlibrary loans and
copies.39 These clarifications serve to amplify the fact that the legislative
intent in writing this exception into copyright law was not to provide
permission to libraries and archives to violate the rights of authors and
others that create original works, but rather to try and reach a balance
between the needs of libraries and scholars and the rights of the copyright
holders.40

In 1998, the Act was updated to reflect the innovations in digital
technology. Congress was concerned about the implications of having
digital copies accessible on the internet and how that would affect the
copyright holders’ rights.41 To address this concern, the Senate clarified
that “digital libraries and archives that exist only in the virtual (rather than
physical) sense on . . . the Internet” do not fall under the library
exemption.42 Moreover, digital copies may not be accessed outside the
premises of the library.43
¶10

35

17 U.S.C. § 108(d).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 74.
37
Id. at 75.
38
Nimmer, supra note 18, at § 8.03(E)(2)(f)(i).
39
17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2).
40
See Nimmer, supra note 18, at § 8.03; S. REP. NO. 105-109 (1998) (Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).
41
See S. REP. NO. 105-109 (1998) (DMCA).
42
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
43
Id.
36
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Google’s library digitization program does not appear to meet the
rigid requirements of the library exemption. The biggest hurdle for Google
with respect to this exemption is the fact that Google is a for-profit
company with a commercial purpose behind its library; the searches will
generate revenue from the advertisements next to the displayed book pages.
Even if this obvious commercial interest did not exist, Google is still a forprofit company starting the library to help its business. Taken by itself,
Google’s for-profit nature should be enough of a commercial tie to
disqualify the Google library from the exemption.44 Even if Google was
merely digitizing the collections of the library for the library and not
intending to make the collection available from its site, the commercial
nature of Google’s business would preclude this project from qualifying for
the exemption.45
¶11

¶12
The second major problem for Google is the systematic nature of its
copying. The statute’s prohibition against permitting photocopies to
substitute for a subscription or purchase easily applies to Google.46
Google’s plan to copy library volumes without paying the copyright holders
for the right to do so (i.e. not obtaining a license), allows Google to access
information without having to purchase copies. Even interlibrary loans are
prohibited when done in “such aggregate quantities as to substitute” for
purchasing a copy of the loaned material.47 Google’s intention is, at a
minimum, comparable to that of a library taking advantage of interlibrary
loans to supplement its collection. If the libraries were not offering their
material to Google, the company would have to pay to acquire it and
thereby acknowledge the rights of the copyright holder.

Finally, the legislative history makes clear that only physical
libraries, not websites, are allowed to make digital copies.48 Coupling this
limitation with the taint of Google’s commercial nature, it becomes
apparent that its library digitization program will not qualify for this
exemption. However, nothing in the library exemption precludes a finding
of fair use with regards to an infringing copy. Although not protected by
the library exemption, Google’s library project is not necessarily unlawful.
In order to determine its lawfulness, a full fair use analysis must be
undertaken.
¶13

44

See 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (2000).
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
46
See id.
47
17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2).
48
See S. REP. NO. 105-109 (1998) (DMCA).
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III. FAIR USE ANALYSIS
¶14
Fair use is an affirmative defense to what would otherwise be an
infringing act, such as reproducing a copyrighted work.49 The defense
attempts to balance the “inherent tension” in the purpose and
implementation of copyright law. 50 On the one hand, the encouragement of
new creative works requires creators retain the ability to profit from their
labors while the advancement of science and knowledge demands broad
public access to prior works.51 Fair use allows “others than the owner of the
copyright” to use, without permission, copyrighted work when
“reasonable”52 to promote “science and the useful arts.”53
¶15
There is no bright line rule to distinguish what is reasonable fair use
from what is actionable infringement.54 The statute provides a list of
examples of fair use, including “teaching . . . , scholarship, or research,” but
the list is not exhaustive. Instead a court is to “apply an equitable rule of
reason” by weighing four non-exclusive statutory factors, none of which are
singularly determinative, to decide if a use is a “fair use.”55 The four factors
are: (1) “the purpose and character of the use”, (2) “the nature of the
copyrighted work”, (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion used”
and (4) “the effect of the use on the potential market.”56 This balancing was
best described when the Supreme Court explained that “[a]lthough copying
to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to fair use
than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is not simply
two-dimensional.”57 This case-by-case analysis facilitates the balancing of
two opposing interests, but fails to offer clear precedent. Rather, each
ruling is fact specific. The remainder of this section will address each of the
four factors in turn and apply each factor to Google’s library digitization
project.

49

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590 (1994); Harper & Row Publ., Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 561
(1985).
50
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
51
Id.; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477-78
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
53
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
54
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Sony, 464 U.S. at 448, n.31.
55
Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-50.
56
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
57
Sony, 464 U.S. at 455, n.40.
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A. Purpose and character of the use
¶16
The first factor of a fair use analysis is the purpose and character of
the potential infringer’s use of the copyrighted work.58 The statute
specifically states that this part of the analysis should take into
consideration whether the use was “of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”59 If the use is for commercial purposes, a
presumption weighs against fair use.60 In a practical sense, however, the
Court has found that commerciality is not very helpful in determining fair
use because “most secondary uses of copyrighted material, including nearly
all the uses listed in the statutory preamble [as fair use examples], are
commercial.”61 If commerciality alone precluded fair use, it would be
difficult to find any otherwise infringing use that could be deemed fair.62
¶17
Accordingly, the crux of this inquiry is not whether the motive of
the use is only commercial but whether the use allows the user to “profit
from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price for it.”63 An assessment of commerciality must include an
examination of the degree of the exploitation.64 Exploitative, while not
officially defined, relates to how much profit potential is being taken away
from a copyright holder65 and how necessary the infringing use is to the
user’s ability to profit.66 For example, copying a television show so that one
can watch it later is not commercial and supports a finding of fair use.67
Making a low quality “thumbnail” copy of an image for display by a
website search engine is not “highly exploitive” and accordingly “weighs
only slightly” against fair use.68 But copying a small number of words that
comprise the “heart” of an unpublished book to “scoop” its publication in a
headline magazine story is exploitative, commercial and weighs strongly
against fair use.69
¶18
The commercial aspect of the character of the use is offset by
whether or not the use is transformative.70 A transformative use that adds to
or changes the copyrighted work to give it “new expression, meaning or
58

17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
Id.
60
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (1985) (citing Sony 464 U.S. at 451).
61
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
62
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
63
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
64
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
65
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63.
66
See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
67
Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
68
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
69
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63.
70
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
59
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message” generally furthers the purpose of copyright protection, to
“promote science and the arts;”71 while a use that merely supersedes the
original is not transformative.72 As a result, the more transformative the
work is, the more the balance will be shifted towards fair use.73
Transformative use requires more than a mere shift of format or different
purpose.74 Rather, a transformation must create something new.75 For
example, a parody is transformative,76 but retransmitting a radio show over
a phone line so advertisers can ensure their commercials are broadcast is
not.77
Here, the commercial factor weighs against Google since Google is
copying the books in order to enhance the value of its service to consumers
and will be selling advertising space next to the copyrighted works.
However, it is difficult to distinguish this from the thumbnail images that
were deemed commercial but only slightly tipped the balance against fair
use.78 Both use the copies in a search engine database and neither uses the
copy to promote their service.79 It seems likely that the commercial aspect
of Google’s use of the copyrighted books would be analyzed in much the
same way and would be found to be of minimal significance in the overall
fair use analysis.
¶19

The question then becomes whether the public service that Google
is offering by digitizing all of these books and making them searchable
online will outweigh its commercial exploitation of the works. Merely
copying a book into a digital format would not be deemed transformative
because all that Google is changing is the medium (print to digital).80
However, the fact that the text of the book is then searchable could be
considered transformative because Google is adding something that is
¶20

71

Id. at 579; See also Williams & Wilkins v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl.
1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (finding that “in general, the law gives
copying for scientific purposes a wide scope” and since the instant case involved
a non-profit institution seeking only to advance medical knowledge that
supported a finding of fair use until the legislature acted.).
72
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
73
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
74
Infinity Broad. Corp., 150 F.3d at 108.
75
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
76
Id.
77
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 109.
78
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
79
See id. The website in Kelly was not attempting to sell the images, whereas
Google’s shopping site, Froogle, will be a link from which one can buy the
copyrighted work. This distinction seems immaterial though since Froogle only
provides links to other outlets and is not really a retailer of the books, let alone
the copies.
80
See Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 108, n.2.
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unavailable in the print version. Being able to search the text allows for
much more specific inquiries by a user than can be accomplished using a
card catalog or even an index of a particular work. This extra functionality
promotes the key copyright interests of “science and the useful arts”81 by
giving researchers easier, more valuable access to large numbers of works.
Additionally, this service “do[es] not supplant the need for originals”82
because the entirety of the work will not be available to a Google user; the
user will still have to find the original at the library or purchase it after
determining the work’s relevance to the user’s research. The Google library
does “benefit the public by enhancing information gathering techniques on
the internet.”83
¶21
However, there is still a distinction between adding “new
expression” and adding new or different functionality. New expression is
what is required for a use to be transformative.84 Thus, while the Google
library may be new and useful, it is not necessarily transformative.
Accordingly, as in the “thumbnails” case,85 an analysis of the first factor
weighs slightly against Google.

B. Nature of the copyrighted work
¶22
The second factor in a fair use analysis is the nature of the
copyrighted work that is potentially infringed.86 The more creative the
expression embodied in a work, the more likely a copy will not be fair use87
since the copyright system is meant to provide a monopoly to authors to
provide “incentive to create.”88 Correspondingly, copying factual works,
including factual elements of creative works, is more likely to be fair use.89
Another important characteristic is whether the work is published.90 An
unpublished work is less likely to be subject to fair use.91 Other elements
factor into this analysis depending on the particular circumstances, such as
in parody, where even pure creative uses can be fair.92

81

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Williams & Wilkins v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345,
1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
82
See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
83
Id.
84
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 108.
85
Kelly, 336 F.3d 811.
86
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
87
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
88
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479-480
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89
Harper & Row Publ., Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
90
Id. at 564.
91
Id.
92
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
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Here, Google is making exact copies of works, some of which will
blend fact and creative expression, and some of which will be pure creative
expression. Google fails to show some accepted fair use reason, such as
parody, for the copies. Accordingly, this factor will weigh against Google.
¶23

C. Amount and substantiality of the portion used
¶24
The third fair use factor is the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the copyrighted work used in relation to the entirety of the
copyrighted work and the purpose of the copy.93 Even making a copy that
is not significant in terms of size might preclude fair use if the copy
substantively captures the essence of the work.94 At one end of the fair use
spectrum, copying an entire work generally precludes a finding of fair use.95
Usually when a “user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its original
purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use” is
inapplicable.96 However, under the right circumstances a copy of an entire
creative work might still be fair use. For example, making a copy of a
television program for home viewing at a later time entails copying the
entirety of a creative work but has been found to be fair use.97 This factor is
especially relevant when analyzed in context with the other factors, for it
can indicate likelihood of market harm under the fourth factor or lack of
transformative character under the first factor.98
¶25
In Google’s case, examination of the amount and substantiality
seems to weigh against a finding of fair use. Google is copying books in
their entirety, which would normally preclude fair use unless mitigating
circumstances were found.99 Even though Google is only displaying a small
portion of the work to users, the research system requires the copy of the
original in its entirety to be functional. When viewed together with the first
factor (the purpose of the project) the copying of entire works is required in
order for the service to be valuable. Copying the entirety of works is also
what allows the project to potentially be deemed transformative, from a text
one reads to a text one searches. In viewing Google’s work in this light,
this factor weighs in favor of fair use. However, this weight is offset by the
potential harm implied by looking at this factor together with the fourth
factor as set forth below. The interplay of this factor with factors one and
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four balances out and results in this factor neither strongly supporting nor
denying fair use.

D. Effect of use upon the potential market
¶26
The fourth factor is generally considered the “single most
important” in a fair use analysis.100 This factor relates to the effect that the
potentially infringing use has on the prospective market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work.101 The markets considered are those currently in
existence, as well as any potential markets for the original or derivative
works that a creator might “develop or license others to develop.”102 This
does not include all imaginable derivative markets; rather it encompasses
only those which a creator might foreseeably enter.

A use that substitutes for the original is not fair use because it
harms the market for the original: users turn to the substitute instead of the
original.103 This factor does not just encompass loss of value; even if use
causes the copyright owner to gain, this factor can still weigh against fair
use. For example, if an unknown song is used in a movie without
permission and the movie makes the song a hit, even though the copyright
owner in the song gains commercial advantage because of the use, the use is
still unfair.104 Additionally, courts will examine the impact that
“unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by” the
potential infringer would have on the market for the original or its
derivatives.105 Basically, the pertinent question is not just what the impact
of Google’s project on the market is, but what would the impact on the
market be if there were thousands of websites performing the same service.
¶27

¶28
One particularly instructive example for Google’s project is
MP3.COM.106 MP3.COM purchased compact discs and reproduced them
into a digital format (mp3 file) and then stored the files in an online
database. The company’s non-paying subscribers were allowed to access
any music that they could prove they owned or that they agreed to
purchase.107 When sued for infringement by a number of record companies,
100

Harper & Row Publ., Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). See
also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
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MP3.COM maintained that the impact of its service would be positive since
the service promoted purchase and ownership of the music.108 The court
rejected this argument on the premise that the record companies had the
right to grant or withhold a license to perform such a service.109 The fact
that “plaintiffs have not shown that such licensing is traditional, reasonable,
or likely to be developed” is irrelevant.110 The licensing market “directly
derives” from the exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder and the
copyright holder has the right to “curb the development of such a derivative
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on
terms the copyright owner finds acceptable.”111
In so construing this factor, the court reserved a broad right to the
copyright holder. In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. held that making and using lower
resolution thumbnail copies of copyrighted digital images does not infringe
a copyright owner’s potential to license its images.112 Since the images
were still only available in a useful, high quality form from the copyright
owner and the copyright owner had the ability to license those quality
images, the court did not find infringement.113 The potential market to
license use of the low quality derivative thumbnail images was not
acknowledged by the court.114
¶29

¶30
In analyzing Google’s case, this broad right to license other uses
reserved to the copyright holder presents a tricky problem. MP3.COM did
not produce a general public good by allowing a user to access her music
collection from any computer. Google’s digital library is arguably much
more beneficial to society. At the same time, there could be a valuable
licensing right for a copyright holder that Google is potentially infringing.
By digitizing these libraries, Google is preempting the copyright holders
from licensing their books to a search engine(s) for inclusion in such a
searchable index. This right is potentially valuable if Google, Yahoo, MSN,
and other search engines all determine they need to provide this kind of
access to their users; licensing the digital, searchable copy from the
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copyright holders should be the only way to provide it. Google is also
taking away the copyright holder’s ability to control access to her work.
The copyright holder, for example a large publishing house, might plan to
establish a similar online library and use its exclusive library to draw
internet users to its site, whereupon the publisher would then be able to sell
advertisement space or perhaps would just be the exclusive online retailer
for its works. Google is preempting this right without providing any
consideration and that would cut against fair use.
¶31
However, since Google’s potentially infringed market is
speculative; a court just may choose not to acknowledge it, as was done in
Kelly. Whether or not a court would believe that a potential market exists is
impossible to predict. While the court in MP3.COM saw the infringed
market, the court in Sony did not see the potential market that the video tape
recorder (VTR) might be infringing.115 While this distinction rests
somewhat on the commercial nature of the MP3.COM business and the
non-commercial nature of making home videos, Google’s project, like the
thumbnail images, is somewhere in between. Google is not selling a
product and is not relying on the digital library to make a profit, yet what
the search engine is providing extends well beyond personal use and the
project will generate advertising revenue from searches of the digitized
pages, which, unlike the thumbnail images, renders the licensing
opportunity more apparent. Additionally, most of the larger copyright
holders that Google would be infringing the rights of have already
voluntarily signed up for the similar Google Print program.116 This fact
negates the notion that a commercial harm is occurring, but the presence of
a commercial harm is not determinative for this factor. Also, Google Print
has one key difference from Google’s library project: Google Print allows
publishers to share in the advertising revenue earned from their works.117
This quality could be seen as a substantial difference which equates to a
voluntary licensing for consideration as opposed to Google’s taking through
the library digitization program.

Due to the combination of the incredible breadth of Google’s
project and the number of copyright holders potentially harmed by the
project, with the fact that Google is a for-profit company that will generate
advertisement revenue from this venture, it appears that the project is
¶32
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commercial and affects a potential licensing right of the copyright holders.
As such, this factor would weigh against a finding of fair use.

CONCLUSION
¶33
Even an analysis of the four fair use factors fails to predict a ruling
on Google’s library digitization project with any certainty. With no factor
strongly supporting Google and the last factor, which is usually the most
important, weighing against the project, the commercial motive, market
usurpation and extensive scope of the project would likely outweigh the
public benefits and push a court’s analysis over into a finding of unfair use.
However, it is possible that if a court battle were to ensue over this project,
that it could be deemed a fair use. Past decisions dealing with fair use in
hotly contested situations involving equally innovative technology have
come down on the side of expanding the rights of the public over those of
the copyright holders.118 In Sony, even though the copyright holders were
painting a doom and gloom picture of the future, as the right holders would
be apt to do here, the court was able to see past their vision and recognize
the benefits of allowing the potential infringement of the VTR.119 The
copyright holders quickly came to realize that what the court had done was
in their best interests, as well.
¶34
Betting on a favorable reading of the law, as in Sony, is a risky
proposition for both Google and the copyright holders, and accordingly is
not the ideal course for either. Litigation such as this is costly and
extremely time-consuming. The Sony litigation took at least five years120 –
about as long as Google plans to spend to digitize half of the fifteen million
volumes it currently plans to make available online. While, as one scholar
points out, Google might have the money to take this chance on litigation
and appears to be willing to do so,121 in a climate of such rapid
technological change, the final outcome of the litigation might be irrelevant
by the time it is reached as a new challenge or opportunity might be pushing
the boundaries of fair use in some other novel way. Litigation will also
potentially encourage others who are not as well endowed, or simply more
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risk averse, to wait-and-see rather than commencing similar, competing
projects which might lead to further public benefits. With some publishing
companies already beginning to grumble that Google’s project might “run
afoul of copyright laws,”122 it seems that litigation might be inevitable, but
it is not the best option for resolving whether it is in the interests of “science
and the useful arts”123 to allow projects similar to Google’s library
digitization or to stymie such projects so that copyright holders might
protect their own turf.
¶35
Rather than give a court the chance to make this ruling and
potentially delay the implementation of this project, Google could actively
try to recruit copyright holders into partnering with it. There is some
suggestion that many copyright holders would willingly sign up for such a
partnership.124 While the list of publishers signed on to Google Print
appears to be extensive,125 experience with new technology has shown that
the affected industry is generally slow to adopt change, even when that
change turns out to be in best interests of the industry.126 Google’s digital
library has the possibility of generating revenue (through advertisements
which Google could share with copyright holders) and sales (through
increased exposure for copyrighted works) for the copyright holders, but
does not threaten to harm the copyright holders since Google is not
replacing a service that anyone currently pays for; the project is replacing a
trip to the library. Even with these apparent positive attributes to Google’s
project, the reluctance of copyright holders to adopt innovations in the past
suggests that at least some of them would be unwilling to voluntarily sign
onto this project as well. Unfortunately, all the pitfalls of litigation
discussed above will be present if just one publisher holds out and refuses to
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agree to the project or to settle with Google. This makes the likelihood of
successfully forging voluntary partnerships with all the copyright holders
unlikely.127
The only other real alternative is to re-examine and revise the
copyright law itself. Copyright law developed in response to technological
change, specifically the development of the printing press, and as
innovations have occurred, “Congress . . . has fashioned the new rules that
new technology made necessary.”128 One commentator suggests this is
what is needed now as well; that Google’s project should be an impetus to
“[c]lean up the copyright system.” 129 While this, like litigation, would also
be a time consuming undertaking, it would allow a permanent policy change
so that future beneficial projects by private parties would not face the
uncertain legal status that Google’s project seems to face.130
¶36

Whichever approach is eventually employed – litigation,
negotiation or legal reform – one hopes that valuable projects such as
Google’s that “enable a wide range of creative work to be efficiently built
on by others”131 will not be hampered but rather enabled by the outcome.
One thing is clear in looking at the Google library digitization; it is a project
that excites people with its possibilities, a result that seems to fit in well
with the spirit of innovation that the copyright laws are meant to protect,
and not something the law or its application should obstruct.
¶37
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